that time had not manifested great interest in the journalistic ventures of the exiles. But he followed political events closely and was one of the first among the moderate S-D who tried to outline a policy against the war while, at the same time, rejecting defeatism. He believed such a policy was possible for a Socialist party if it approached the war as an international problem. The ultimate aim, he reasoned, must be not the victory of either coalition but a durable peace based on justice. Neither blind support of the national government nor crippling opposition to the war effort would serve that purpose. By undermining the military policy of the Tsarist government, Russian Socialists might become the tools of German militarism. Similarly, the German Socialists, by challenging the Kaiser, might ultimately lend support to the forces of absolutism in Russia. The solution should be a co-ordinated movement on both sides for a negotiated peace, without victors and vanquished, without annexations and indemnities.

This plan sounded logical. *If* the Socialist parties of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Russia succeeded in mobilizing the masses of the people behind the slogan of just peace; *if* they were able to co-ordinate their efforts so as not to help the imperialist forces of either coalition; *if* they could gain confidence and support of other political parties—then the World War could be ended and a durable and just peace established. But the success of the plan depended on several *if*'s, and this was the source of its weakness. Indeed, the state of affairs within the European Socialist movement should not have fostered any illusions in this respect.

Since 1889, the European Socialist parties had been loosely united in an International Federation, dominated ideologically by the German and Austrian Marxists. Under the strain of the war, a deep split had developed in their ranks; in each country the majority of the Socialist party joined the National Unity front, while the minority shifted toward revolutionary defeatism. The Socialist majorities were represented in most of the war cabinets and accused the minorities of treason to the national cause. In turn, the minorities accused the majorities of betraying the ideal of international socialism and believed that only common action of radical minorities against the Socialist majorities and the government would achieve a just peace. The plan of common action of Socialist parties developed by Tseretelli ran in the same general direction and, in retrospect, appears to be the Russian—or more precisely, the Siberian—version of ideas that had found their expression at the Socialist conference in Zimmerwald. The difference from the West European Zimmerwaldism was that Tseretelli thought of common action of the Socialist minorities and majorities.